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Argument, deliberation, dialectic and the nature of the political. A CDA perspective1 
 
We are grateful to Alan Finlayson and Colin Hay for these challenging responses to our book2. In 
what follows, we hope to give a satisfactory answer to their main arguments. In different ways, both 
Hay and Finlayson argue that, in focusing on argumentation and deliberation, we misunderstand the 
nature of the political. Secondly, Finlayson thinks that there is a discontinuity between CDA, in its 
previous versions, and our present framework. Thirdly, Finlayson claims that CDAಬs focus on 
representations (on discourses) should not be displaced by a focus on action, that representations 
are fundamental in politics, that disagreement is fundamentally over premises, not over practical 
conclusions, and a rhetorical (not dialectical) perspective is best suited to analysing political 
discourse.  
 
The nature of the political 
Why is the political inherently connected to (practical) argumentation and deliberation, in our view? 
Let us briefly recapitulate our position.  In Chapter 1, we begin from a broadly Aristotelian 
conception of the political, in terms of deliberation on the common good, leading to decision and 
action. We also briefly survey various contemporary views formulated in terms of deliberation, 
decision-making, agency, action, resolution of conflict and disagreement by peaceful means, the 
public-private divide. It is not our intention to provide another definition of the political, but to 
enumerate what seems distinctive about it in various strands of political theory. Hay finds we are 
unduly privileging argumentation and deliberation among these strands. He argues that to ಫreduce 
political discourse to practical argumentationಬ has three unfortunate consequences: it excludes 
political discourse which is not practical argumentation; it (presumably, artificially) reconstructs 
informal and non-elite political discourse as argumentative; finally, it leads to a na±ve and idealized 
conception of democratic deliberation against which actual public deliberation is evaluated. For him, 
ಫthe political is about powerಬ and to define it in terms of deliberation or argumentation, as we do, 
means to seriously ಫnarrow downಬ the domain of political discourse analysis. This narrow focus 
allegedly also makes us unable to see as political all those situations in which ಫpower is exercised 
without due deliberationಬ.  
 
Let us emphasize from the start that we do not for a moment forget that the political is also about 
power and we devote a lot of space to definitions of power (by Lukes and Searle, Chapter 3) in 
relation to the political domain. Power, however, will remain a nebulous notion, of little analytical 
use, unless we can also show how it can be investigated in its discursive dimension, how it manifests 
itself ಫinಬ (as well as ಫbehindಬ) discourse.  
Our approach draws to a large extent on dialectical theories of argumentation, which themselves 
often explicitly draw on linguistic pragmatics, i.e. on theories of verbal action (Searle 1969). Like 
pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), we see argumentation as a verbal social 
activity (or a macro-speech act) with an illocutionary and a perlocutionary dimension: people do 
things by means of arguing, and this activity has effects. Our focus on practical reasoning, critical 
questioning and action is coherent with this overall pragmatic and dialectical view. We draw 
extensively on Searleಬs (2010) theory of the construction of the social world by means of speech acts, 
which is also to a large extent a theory of political power and of the specificity of the political. So, 
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starting from the Aristotelian conception on the nature of the political, defined in general terms in 
Chapter 1, we gradually move (via Chapters 2 and 3) towards a view which is strongly influenced by 
Searleಬs conception of institutional reality and we draw on that view in the analytical chapters.  
^ŽŵĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞĂůity are perhaps worth restating.  For Searle 
(2010: 164), all political power is ಫdeontic powerಬ and is therefore a matter of rights, obligations, 
duties, permissions, authorizations, prohibitions, and the like. These are conferred on individuals 
and objects in the processes whereby human beings create institutional reality. In the political 
domain, for example, becoming a citizen or an elected politician confers rights and obligations on 
individuals. All institutions enable and constrain human action, they create possibilities as well as 
restrictions on peopleಬs behaviour as agents operating within their constitutive rule-governed 
boundaries. The whole point of institutional reality is in fact to create and regulate power 
relationships between people: power flows through institutional reality via deontic powers 
collectively assigned and recognized. The essence of the political as a particular institutional domain 
is to be found (for Searle) in the system of deontic reasons that political institutions provide as 
(desire-independent) motives for action. Conflict or disagreement in politics can be over the 
distribution of social goods, but it can be also be over the (re)distribution of deontic powers, e.g. 
over who has the right to decide on matters of common concern. It is in this sense that we 
suggested seeing power as a reason, motivating action, enabling or constraining it. 
At various points in the analytical chapters we focus on conflicts over perceived violations of existing 
commitments  ದ the Liberal-Democratsಬ pre-electoral pledge not to increase tuition fees, or the 
current governmentಬs perceived failure to act in accordance with justice in failing to punish those 
responsible for the crisis. We show how such commitments are regarded as constitutive of the 
political institutions in question, of the implicit social contract with citizens. They are deontic reasons 
that political actors have, that ought therefore to motivate them. Political actors sometimes go to 
great lengths to show that they are in fact motivated by such reasons ದ for instance by a public 
commitment to fairness. Appealing to such reasons can be viewed as a manifestation of political 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?right ƚŽĨĂŝƌƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛobligation to act fairly are thus 
explicitly recognized as constraints on what the government can do.  But deontic reasons can also be 
discussed in relation to power in another sense: the power to impose an argument (a policy) even 
when it is not a good argument (policy).  Online commentators, in their capacity as citizens (Chapter 
5), may avail themselves of their right to criticize government policy, but the fact that the force of 
the better argument is ignored by government and fails to lead to social change is also a 
manifestation of power.  A similar point can be made about the debate on austerity (Chapter 4): 
extensive deliberation in various institutional settings across society has not led the government to 
change its position on austerity policies. This may not be because of some flaw in the quality of 
public debate but because the (possibly better) reasons emerging from that debate are being 
continuously overridden by reasons having to do with power, either political or economic power, or 
both. 
Hay claims that ಫwhilst all situations of deliberation are political, not all political situations are 
deliberativeಬ and cannot be therefore defined ಫin terms of deliberation or practical argumentationಬ. 
We believe on the contrary that not all deliberative situations are political: people deliberate (either 
by themselves or together with others) on all sorts of non-political private issues.  (This is to say that 
we do not extend the scope of the political as widely as Hay seems to do. For us, a private issue can 
become political, but only if the individual engages with it as a political actor, e.g. as a citizen in 
possession of rights, not as a private individual. By failing to relate the political to an institutional 
order, Hay deprives himself of a standard that would stop everything, and therefore nothing, from 
being political.)  However, the political situations we analyze in the book do instantiate the genre of 
deliberation because, in all cases, argumentation is oriented towards the resolution of a difference 
of opinion about what to do, by means of critical testing of a practical claim, involving an attempt to 
think of reasons that would count against it. We agree none-the-less that not all political situations 
are deliberative, yet the ones that are non-deliberative in our view are not those to which Hay 
refers. There are examples of negotiation, adjudication or mediation in politics; like deliberation, 
these are argumentative in nature ದ there is no doubt about that. And there are other activities 
(ಫpre-genresಬ, ಫmacro-speech actsಬ) besides argumentation going on in political discourse namely 
narrative, description, explanation. We see them as generally subsumed or subordinated to 
argumentation, in the sense that, ultimately, they are supposed to give people reasons for what to 
believe and how to act. In a political context, a particular narrative or explanation about how the 
crisis came about would lose its pragmatic point or rationale unless it were connected ultimately 
with some conclusion about what it would be recommended to do.  Finally, there are activity types 
in the political field that fall under Aristotleಬs class of epideictic (ceremonial) discourse ದ these are 
also non-deliberative but are fairly marginal and are outside the scope of our book.    
These, however, are not the types of non-deliberative discourse that Hay seems to have in mind. For 
Hay, non-deliberative political situations are those in which ಫpower in exercised without due 
deliberationಬ. So obviously, for him, having (or pursuing) power is not a reason for action that enters 
in agentsಬ reasoning processes, but somehow substitutes reasoning and deliberation. You can either 
ಫdulyಬ deliberate or pursue your power interests without deliberation. This is wrong, in our view. 
Throughout the book we try to develop a view of power as a reason or motive for action, a reason 
within deliberative processes, one which may often trump other reasons, but a reason none-the-
less. If an agent decides to ignore all the potential consequences that his proposed action might 
have on others and to act solely on grounds of actually having the political power to decide, or in 
order to further his own economic power interests, then, however minimally, that agentಬs action has 
been preceded by a deliberative process, in which some power-related concern has overridden 
other possible (maybe more legitimate) concerns. It may not be ಫdueಬ deliberation, but it is still 
deliberation. Both good and bad arguments are arguments, and deliberation that would fail all 
normative standards of evaluation is deliberation none-the-less. (A similar point is made in political 
theory by Elster ದ see page 30 in our book). 
To sum up, we have no problem with the claim that power is often exercised without ಫdue 
deliberationಬ. This is what some of our analyses also illustrate: decisions for action taken by 
government after insufficient or inadequate deliberation, or by ignoring the force of the better 
arguments provided elsewhere. Power is of course often exercised without ಫdue deliberationಬ, but it 
is not exercised without deliberation altogether. Simply, this is because to act within the political 
presupposes the existence of certain reasons for action, without which we could not speak about the 
political as an institutional order. Whatever other reasons an agent might have, the political provides 
him with a set of reasons that he has to take into account, one way or another, if only to disregard 
them. For us, to allow considerations that are extraneous to the political (say, economic ones) to 
ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŽǀĞƌ ?ƐĂǇ ?ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ŝŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making is also the outcome of a deliberative process, 
although quite possibly one that would not stand up to critical examination. To conclude, the 
political is a socially constructed institutional order.  Its very fabric gives people reasons for action. 
To act within the political means having to take on board these reasons, whatever course of action 
one takes in the end, and whether one is eventually motivated by these deontic reasons or by other 
reasons.  
On the whole, Hay seems to start from a reductive understanding of argumentation and 
deliberation. He does not seem to operate with the usual definition of argumentation, as an activity 
of giving and receiving reasons, of justifying and criticizing propositions. If he did, he would not claim 
that a focus on argument excludes from view private informal contexts: is argumentation not a 
pervasive and banal activity in everyday life, as well as in formal political contexts? As for those 
examples of formal, elite public political discourse that cannot allegedly be discussed as practical 
arguments (ಫnormative argumentation, moral persuasion, ideological proselytizing, argument by 
assertion, folk demonization, name callingಬ), we would reply that some clearly can be discussed in 
terms of practical reasoning (ethics is after all concerned with what people ought to do; as for 
ಫproselytizingಬ, is it not a way of trying to persuade people to support a particular party or position by 
giving reasons why they should?) and some are frankly puzzling (how can an assertion be an 
argument? what exactly is ಫfolk demonizationಬ?) and in need of clarification in order to see whether 
they are indeed non-argumentative.  Similarly, for Hay, deliberation only seems to mean collective 
and possibly even democratic deliberation: an agent reasoning with others (maybe even in a formal 
democratic setting) and examining various alternative options. We do not use deliberation (just) in 
this very strong sense: to allow ŽŶĞ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŽƌŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ?ƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?to prevail over 
ŽŶĞ ?Ɛduties, in deliberating with oneself only, is also a form of deliberation.  
Hay also criticizes the reconstruction of Guardian readersಬ on-line comments as practical 
argumentation, as opposed to analyzing them ಫin their own (political) termsಬ. We are in no doubt 
that the material which we analyse is argumentative and deliberative. The on-line debate on 
bankersಬ bonuses is in fact a good example of the process of critical examination of an argument (the 
original argument in favour of tolerating inequality) by asking many of the possible critical questions 
that can be asked about such an argument (e.g. casting doubt on the acceptability of the premises, 
on the reasonableness of the conclusion given its actual consequences, etc.). In the process, the 
participants are giving reasons in favour of the opposite conclusion, thus constructing a counter-
argument. It is not only an example of argumentation (clearly seen here as ಫcritical discussionಬ or 
testing of a standpoint) but also one of collective deliberation, of weighing reasons in favour of a 
conclusion and its opposite so as to arrive at some normative judgment, albeit in a weakly 
institutionalized context, without clear temporal boundaries, and without the link to a collective 
decision and action that other formal deliberative contexts may afford. The rather puzzling view that 
argumentation and deliberation are absent from such informal political discourse can probably be 
explained in terms of their reductive understanding referred to above.  The same applies to the 
claims that neither the pre-Budget speeches of Alistair Darling nor the speech of Tony Blair should 
be analysed and evaluated as cases of practical argumentation and deliberation. As we show in 
chapters 3 and 4, these arguments are explicitly formulated in terms of weighing reasons in favour 
and against various courses of action; moreover, the responses to these speeches in public and 
parliamentary debate do evaluate and criticize them in exactly these terms, as the outcomes of a 
process that was supposed to adequately test the proposed course of action but failed to do so. This 
indicates that such speeches are evaluated against a normative standard for deliberation, which may 
be idealized, in the sense that actual practice is often very different, but is hardly na±ve.  
Hay concludes that our approach ಫtakes us too far down the path to a narrowly deliberative and 
argumentative understanding of political discourseಬ and prevents the analyst from ಫacknowledging 
the political moment in all discourse and the discursive moment in all politicsಬ. This is an attractively 
symmetrical formulation, but what does it mean? For one thing, we think that Hay is wrong in 
identifying a political moment in all discourse, and we agree instead with Searle, who clearly links 
the political to the public sphere and to a particular institutional order. Secondly, speaking about the 
ಫdiscursive moment in all politicsಬ will not take us very far as analysts unless we are able to say 
something a bit less vague than the obvious fact that politics involves language or discourse. What 
exactly is the generic form of political discourse, what is its point as a form of human action and 
interaction, what is it oriented towards ದ these are more interesting and less obvious questions. And 
Hayಬs argument has not convinced us at all that political discourse is not argumentative, not 
deliberative, not oriented towards persuasion and, via this, towards (coordinating) action.  Nor that 
such features are not useful in differentiating it from other types of discourse, e.g. from scientific 
inquiry or from literature.  
We have addressed Hayಬs objection starting from Searleಬs view of the nature of the political. An 
alternative answer (along the lines we suggest in our section on legitimation in Chapter 3) would 
start by pointing out that the political can also be seen as the realm of public justification and of 
critical questioning of standpoints regarding matters of common concern. Argumentation is precisely 
the activity of justifying or criticizing standpoints. In a modern democratic state, policies that are 
proposed by government cannot be merely asserted, without giving reasons, i.e. without providing 
arguments; moreover, these reasons themselves have to withstand critical examination. We have no 
space to develop this line of argument here but its eventual convergence with the previous one 
should be obvious. 
 
PDA versus CDA? 
In our view, PDA contributes to CDAಬs objective of extending explanatory and normative critique to 
discourse, developing a synthesis of CDA and argumentation analysis. But Finlayson portrays it as 
abandoning the former for the latter, as abandoning ಫcritical neo-Marxist sociologyಬ for ಫliberal 
philosophical valuesಬ, consequently as rejecting rather than building on CDAಬs insights into 
ideological representation.  
Finlayson usefully contextualizes PDA within controversies over the critique of political reason, yet 
does not engage with the treatment of argument evaluation at the heart of our approach, where 
critique of reasonableness is in fact clearly articulated with CDA-type critique. First, it is not just 
analysts that evaluate argumentation, but participants in deliberation as well. Our analytical object 
includes both practical argumentation and participant evaluation, and one consequence is that 
analysts evaluate evaluations. The analysts may come to the conclusion that a widely accepted line 
of argument does not withstand critical examination, yet seems to go unchallenged; or that an 
argument which is widely thought to be unreasonable is not rejected as such but allowed to inform 
policy. In both situations, questions of power, ideology, hegemony arise and can be clearly 
connected to questions of argument reasonableness. Second, the critical questions match the range 
of questions that participants can ask in principle, across diverse contexts of practical argumentation 
and practices of participant evaluation, but may not always ask. Why certain questions are asked 
and others are not can again be discussed in relation to CDA-type concerns with ideology and power. 
Third, in our view, standards of reasonableness hold for particular evaluative practices, they vary 
between practices and can be argued and fought over.  
The possibilities for critical questioning can be viewed as a vehicle for social critique, as well as for 
normative evaluation of arguments; the two are clearly inter-connected. For example, participants 
(or analysts) can question whether the context of action is adequately represented, whether the 
arguer has provided an adequate understanding of what the ಫproblemಬ is (this may include adequate 
ways of defining, explaining, narrating how the situation came about). If the situation is not 
represented (described, defined, narrated, explained) adequately, if the representation cannot 
withstand criticism, one question for social critique would be why it is nevertheless being put 
forward as an adequate representation and whose interests are served by this. Similarly, the 
acceptability of goals and values can be challenged and in asking, for example, whether the arguer 
should have considered other goals or values, one is inevitably connecting with social critique ದ one 
is asking about other peopleಬs goals and values, and thus expanding the deliberative context beyond 
mere instrumentality. Finally, the same can be said about deontic reasons that are part of 
institutional orders: one can either inquire into why legitimate reasons are perhaps being overridden 
or one can attempt to open these reasons up for critique  ? the  ?ƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞ ?ŵĂǇƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ
be indefensible. Normative analysis of arguments cannot help but naturally connect with social 
explanatory critique, and this is via a framework for deliberation-as-critical-questioning. This allows 
for critical questioning that expands the evaluation of any single argument by questioning each 
element of that argument and suggests the possibility of other premises, leading to other 
conclusions. These are increasingly ಫcriticalಬ questions in a critical social analysis (and CDA) sense, 
probing for example into (structural) causes of circumstances and of representations of them, and 
advancing them can amount to ಫpractical critiqueಬ.  
This way of looking at things provides a way of identifying different practices of evaluation in 
different contexts (e.g. parliamentary debates or Guardian readersಬ online comments), evaluating 
particular arguments against the standard of the relevant practice(s) and it makes available, to 
participants as well as analysts, a critique of a particular practice against standards which are 
external to that practice though not external to the social practices of the society in focus. If we 
relate this to Finlaysonಬs account of critique in three ಫtraditionsಬ, it includes a Kantian concern with a 
standard of reasonableness against which arguments can be assessed but it also opens up a 
Wittgensteinian/Skinnerian concern with the contextual and historical nature of orders of 
reasonableness and also accommodates the concern of the third (Marxist) tradition with normative 
and explanatory critique and ಫpractical critiqueಬ.  
Alan Finlayson tries to align our framework with one or another of the above traditions, but we are 
not ourselves explicitly or intentionally positioning ourselves within any of these. Our discussion of 
the constitutive deontology of the political may strike Finlayson as clearly ಫneo-Kantianಬ, but for us 
this is just one element of the overall picture. No doubt, desire-independent reasons for action are 
one category of reasons, both in politics and ordinary life, and practical conclusions can be evaluated 
as reasonable or not depending on how they take such reasons into account. It does not follow 
however that action is only reasonable if it is motivated by such reasons, or that external a priori 
standards of reasonableness should always be followed inflexibly, regardless of their consequences. 
On the contrary, we tend to emphasize how policies are more or less reasonable depending on the 
actual consequences or effects they produce, on how they endeavour to take these into account and 
how they manage to balance a concern for several possibly conflicting non-overridable concerns. If 
our approach may seem eclectic, this is also because practical reasoning operates with eclectic 
reasons: duties, commitments, desires, interests, consequences, moral-political values, and the like. 
So we would resist any attempt at labelling our approach as ಫKantianಬ or whatever. One further area 
in which we do not see fundamental incompatibilities is between traditional CDA concerns for 
equality and justice and neo-Aristotelian conceptions of ಫhuman flourishingಬ; such syntheses can in 
our view be productive in the work of social scientists  (e.g. Sayer 2011).  
 
Action versus representation, rhetoric versus dialectic 
Both Alan Finlayson and Colin Hay criticize PDA for focusing on action at the expense, as they see it, 
of representation. While the focus of the book is indeed on practical argumentation and action, we 
refer to extensive treatments of representation in earlier CDA not to dismiss them, but to strengthen 
their critical relevance, by showing that representations are best analysed as elements of forms of 
action, or genres, be they argumentative, explanatory, narrative.  
Hay notes that analysts who emphasize the causal/constitutive role of discourses and ideas are 
better at capturing ಫthe political as distinct from the discursive dimension of their analytical fociಬ. The 
fact that he makes this point as a criticism of PDA shows that he misses a crucial point: much 
discussion of the causal/constitutive effects of discourses and ideas has nothing to say about how 
they can have such effects, whereas in our account discourses (ಫideasಬ) can give people reasons for 
favouring one line of action over others and thereby have effects on decisions to act (and lead to 
changes in the world). We are therefore not abandoning the social critique of CDA, but seeking to 
strengthen it. We do not reject CDAಬs insights into ideological representation in favour of normative 
evaluation of arguments, but try to accommodate both within our model of evaluation. 
According to Alan Finlayson, claims of the form ಫwe should do xಬ are not a focus of political disputes; 
the latter ಫtake place not at the level of conclusions but at that of premisesಬ, over ways of 
representing the situation. In other words, the issue is not ಫwhat is to be done?ｔ but ｓwhat is 
going on? If one can persuade the public that ಫthe crisis you face is a crisis of government spending, 
the solution is, in broad outline clearಬ: it follows ಫnaturallyಬ from the definition of the situation.  
In our view, political disputes can be over representations in premises as well as over practical 
conclusions of arguments. First, as we show in our discussion of persuasive definitions (including 
metaphorical definitions) as premises of arguments (pp. 92-95, 170-172, etc.), their use is 
rhetorically motivated and can be effective because certain claims for action follow more 
persuasively from certain representations of the context of action than from others. If the countryಬs 
economy is for example analogous with that of a domestic household, then putting an end to 
borrowing can be more easily defended. It may be therefore rhetorically effective for a politician to 
represent the countryಬs economy as a household economy, but there will always be dialectical 
constraints on that particular way of representing reality (e.g. how good is in fact this analogy or re-
definition?). In other words, even when a particular audience has been persuaded, how rationally 
persuasive is the argument from a normative perspective? The same can be said of Finlaysonಬs own 
example, which involves an implicit explanation. (To say that the crisis is one of government 
spending is to say that it was caused by government spending.) Again, this representation may be 
effective rhetorically, but possibly dialectically questionable, as the underlying explanation may be 
questionable. But casting doubt on the way the situation or circumstances are defined, explained or 
narrated, if it is the case that these circumstances function as premises in a subsequent argument 
for action, will cast doubt on the conclusion that is drawn on the basis of these representations. So 
the political dispute is transferred from the premises to the conclusion, and (in our view) this is 
precisely because the point of defining, explaining or narrating events is to figure out (or make a 
proposal about) what to do, based on first figuring out what the situation is (or at least trying to 
accredit a view of it). To see the dispute as occurring only at the level of the premises would be to 
occlude what the ultimate rationale or point of politics is as a rational goal-oriented human activity, 
which (we think) is not to arrive at some representation of the situation as an end in itself, but in 
view of drawing some practical-normative conclusion, in view of doing something about it. We also 
disagree that, once there is agreement on representations, the conclusion follows naturally. No 
practical conclusion really follows from the premises: practical arguments are typically plausible and 
presumptive in nature, not deductively valid, if only for the reason that there is always some ಫknownಬ 
or ಫunknown unknownಬ that can defeat the move from premises to conclusion.  
Finlayson also claims that representations and action should not be separated (as we allegedly do), 
that representations are actions.  There is a sense in which we would not dispute that: the sense in 
which assertions, directives and other types of speech acts are all speech acts, or the sense in which 
we can speak about the performative power of all language: one can institute the reality of a 
promise but also the reality of a new way of representing reality. But we would not like to miss one 
important difference between these two situations: various types of speech acts (as Searle first 
observed) have different directions of fit. Ultimately, a promise or a directive aims to make the 
world match the words that were spoken (world-to-word direction of fit), while a representative 
(assertive) speech acts aims to correspond to the world (or has a word-to-world direction of fit) and 
expresses a commitment to truth (note that this is different from saying it is true) ದ hence the 
dialectical constraints on any representation or assertion: is it an acceptable (accurate, true) 
representation of the situation?  In other words, not just any kind of reality is a man-made linguistic 
construct, and an assertion is an ಫactionಬ in a different sense than a promise.  We think the 
distinction between representations and actions should be preserved, that doing so is consistent 
with a general theory of human intentionality in which beliefs about the world (i.e. ಫrepresentationsಬ 
of states of affairs,  together with desires, needs, etc.) are reasons for action, and that no useful 
analytical purpose is served by confusing them. In our view, one strength of our framework is that it 
accommodates those aspects of political discourse which are important in Finlaysonಬs view 
(ideological representations, political disputes which centre upon representations) without however 
reducing political discourse to them. On the contrary, it shows how beliefs and representations 
connect with action, via practical reasoning, or how (in our own formulation) structures (e.g. 
discourses, including ideological representations) connect with agency by providing agents with 
reasons for action. 
Our differences may result from a different way of understanding the relationship between rhetoric 
and dialectic. While we draw primarily on dialectical theories of argumentation, Finlayson privileges 
the rhetorical perspective and seems to connect the political domain with rhetoric only. The 
existence of a third-party audience is supposedly the crucial ingredient here: a political actorಬs goal is 
often not to persuade his opponent (as this may be highly unlikely anyway) but to win the debate in 
the eyes of a third-party audience, and to do so he will need to root his arguments in premises that 
will resonate with that audience. All this is true, of course, but we see no reason to abandon 
pragma-dialecticsಬ own way of acknowledging an arguerಬs double (dialectical and rhetorical) goal. 
Nor do we think that politics is not the realm of dialectics but only of rhetoric. As our analyses show, 
arguments in favour of policy X or Y may be rooted in beliefs and values that the audience has or can 
be made to accept, but are also designed to withstand real or anticipated critical questioning from 
that audience, an audience that ಫtalks backಬ, in a process of extended public dialogue, against a 
background of controversy. For us, it is not possible to say of a political speech (e.g. the Blair 
example) that it is ಫrhetoricಬ only, and cannot be discussed as an example of deliberation or from a 
dialectical point of view. We take the view that logic, rhetoric and dialectic are three possible 
perspectives on any argument, and an argument can be rhetorically strong but dialectically and 
logically weak (the case of fallacies) or vice-versa.  
 
Conclusion 
We hope to have answered the most important arguments made by Hay and Finlayson. There are of 
course many areas where our framework needs further development and we are addressing some in 
current work (e.g. developing our concept of strategy, systematizing critical questions into dialectical 
profiles, exploring the ಫproblematizationಬ of situations).  
Naturally, we focus in our book on developing our own particular method, not on applying other 
analystsಬ methods.  We do refer however to other methods in discourse analysis and in 
argumentation theory, and also indicate how other theoretical frameworks (e.g. the cognitive 
theories of metaphor or framing) can be productively articulated with our approach. Hay suggests 
nevertheless that we are promoting a form of ಫmethodological absolutismಬ. In response, we admit 
that we do make a strong case for focusing on practical argument but we do so against the 
background of (what we see as) the rather astonishing neglect of it in political discourse analysis and 
its centrality in politics. One pleasing suggestion in both Finlaysonಬs and Hayಬs responses is that by 
setting out our stall strongly, clearly and maybe provocatively, we might be a catalyst for a much 
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